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The ‘ombuds watchers’: collective dissent and legal protest amongst users of 
public services ombuds 
 
Introduction 
 
This article contributes to legal consciousness scholarship by developing and applying 
an integrated legal consciousness framework to the activities of groups of dissatisfied 
users of public service ombuds, whom we call ‘ombuds watchers’.1 These groups 
campaign to reform the UK’s ombuds system and are part of an emerging phenomenon 
which has been called ‘legal protest’ (Hertogh, 2011). The ombuds watcher 
phenomenon is particularly interesting for legal consciousness researchers, because it 
provides an example of ‘dissenting collectivism’ (Halliday and Morgan, 2013), a recently 
identified extension to Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) classic ‘before the law’, ‘with the law’, 
and ‘against the law’ legal consciousness schema. Here, dissent from legal systems 
involves not only individual disaffection but the collectivization of dissent and the 
undertaking of group protests. Previous legal consciousness scholarship has examined 
these kind of protests in the context of environmental activism (Fritzvold, 2009, Halliday 
and Morgan, 2013) and family and criminal justice (Hertogh, 2011). For the first time, 
this article explores collective protests in relation to ombuds. 
The article argues that legal consciousness provides an appropriate theoretical 
lens for studying user experiences of ombuds processes, and a useful framework for 
understanding the ways in which people make sense of experiences, construct ideas 
                                               
1 The authors use the gender neutral term ‘ombuds’ rather than ‘ombudsman’. See Bondy and Doyle 
(2015) for a discussion of gender neutral terminology.  
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about justice, and make decisions about what action to take in response to 
dissatisfaction. While procedural justice theory (Lind and Tyler, 1988) is the dominant 
paradigm within which user experiences of dispute processes have been studied, this 
article argues that legal consciousness perspectives offer complementary avenues for 
research by adopting a holistic emphasis on the strategies, resources, and schemas 
which people draw on to make sense of their experiences of the justice system.2 While 
the application of legal consciousness to an informal system of justice, such as ombuds, 
may be controversial, this is justified as a result of the semi-legal character of ombuds 
(as statutory, state-provided means of redress against government) and of the pluralistic 
emphasis in legal consciousness literature on constructions of law and justice outwith 
the context of formal state law (Hertogh, 2004).  
In addition, as will be demonstrated in the article’s analysis of the ombuds 
watchers, citizens’ ideas about ombuds are influenced in part by legal ideologies, so 
that legal consciousness provides an important framework for understanding user 
experiences in this context. This approach is also particularly relevant to an 
investigation of the ombuds watchers, since it places emphasis on understanding what 
people do in response to disillusionment with law and the strategies of mobilization and 
protest they adopt as a result (Hertogh, 2011). The ombuds watcher phenomenon, 
therefore, provides a unique opportunity to study groups of citizens who have 
progressed from mobilization through to protest in the course of making complaints and 
to contribute to the legal consciousness scholarship’s interest in the way ordinary 
                                               
2 This will be expanded upon in more empirical and theoretical detail in a forthcoming book by Creutzfeldt 
(2018). 
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people ‘… engage, avoid, or resist the law and legal meanings’ (Ewick and Silbey, 
1998, p. 35).  
Our focus, then, is on understanding the experiences of ordinary people who 
have used ombuds, become dissatisfied, and proceeded to form groups engaged in 
campaigning activities. Here, we follow existing legal consciousness scholarship in 
seeking to understand the way certain groups understand legal institutions, rather than 
in providing normative evaluations of these understandings. The purpose of legal 
consciousness scholarship is not to determine whether ordinary people’s 
understandings of law are objectively ‘correct’, but to explore how people feel about, 
think about, and use, legal ideas. The article will not sit in judgment and assess whether 
the ombuds watchers’ various criticisms of the UK’s ombuds system are valid. Instead, 
the article will limit itself to exploring the role of legal consciousness in relation to the 
ombuds watchers’ activism and to understand how they see the world. This ‘bottom up’ 
approach, concerned only with understanding how lay people perceive the law and legal 
institutions, fits squarely within the legal consciousness tradition. Fritzvold (2009), for 
example, does not evaluate whether environmental activists are justified in protesting 
and Hertogh (2011) does not provide a normative commentary on the protests he 
examines in the context of family and criminal justice. In a similar vein, this article is 
limited to exploring how the watchers make sense of their interactions with the ombuds 
system. 
However, in adopting this bottom-up perspective, we do not dismiss the value of 
exploring the policy implications that arise from any divergence between what the 
watchers subjectively expect from ombuds and what the ombuds system is objectively 
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designed to provide. Especially when considered in light of other data suggesting high 
levels of user dissatisfaction with public services ombuds (Creutzfeldt, 2015), the 
watchers’ protests may well highlight important gaps between expectation and reality in 
terms of citizens’ experiences of using ombuds. Such dissatisfaction is important to 
assess in terms of what it means for justice policy, particularly in the context of a 
broader justice system in which greater emphasis is being placed on informal processes 
(Ministry of Justice, 2016). The tension between what citizens may want in terms 
redress and the mechanisms which are available to them has previously been the 
subject of critical academic commentary, with the system for citizens’ redress assessed 
as failing to meet citizens’ needs (Dunleavy et al, 2010). While the watchers’ protests 
may well provide a novel and helpful insight into matters of redress design (Le Sueur, 
2012), the focus of the present article is limited to the theoretical conceptualisation of 
the watchers’ protests in terms of legal consciousness scholarship.3  
 The article has three ambitions. The first is to analyze existing legal 
consciousness literature with a view to synthesizing key elements and setting out an 
integrated framework for use in empirical scholarship. The second involves providing an 
empirical analysis of the ombuds watchers’ campaigns, which is framed as a case study 
of the legal consciousness schema described by Halliday and Morgan (2013) as 
‘dissenting collectivism’. The article’s third ambition is to draw attention to the 
phenomenon of ‘legal protest’ (Hertogh, 2011), whereby aspects of the justice system 
become subject to public campaigning. Hertogh (ibid., p.31) has called for attention to 
be paid to the ‘anonymous people’ who have ‘lost confidence in the law’ and to 
                                               
3 We appreciate the value of drawing out the policy implications of our research and we will return, in the 
conclusion, to consider how the data presented in this article may be developed in future research. 
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‘consider critics of the justice system as real persons with genuine concerns about the 
administration of justice’. The present article is a response to this call. 
 The article is in five parts. Part I contextualizes the UK’s ombuds system and the 
ombuds watchers’ campaigns. Part II analyses the legal consciousness literature. Part 
III applies legal consciousness approaches to the study of ombuds. Part IV describes 
the methodology. Part V presents the empirical analysis. 
 
Part I: UK ombuds and ombuds watchers 
 
Ombuds in the UK 
 
Ombuds deal with complaints from citizens about the provision of public services (Buck 
et al, 2011, Seneviratne, 2002). One of the aims of an ombuds is to even out the power 
imbalance between the individual and the state by providing an avenue for redress. This 
aim is reflected in the way ombuds have developed around the world, although there is 
diversity in how ombuds have evolved in different jurisdictions (Reif, 2004). In the UK, 
ombuds are one of the four ‘pillars’ of the administrative justice system along with 
courts, tribunals, and internal redress mechanisms (Law Commission, 2010). The first 
UK ombuds was instituted in 1967, with the aim of providing additional remedies to 
those available through courts and tribunals (Buck et al, 2011). In particular, ombuds 
were instituted to provide redress for maladministration and to consider complaints 
about administrative matters unsuitable for court or tribunal adjudication (ibid.). A 
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particular feature of ombuds is their inquisitorial approach and their procedural 
informality, which is designed to be accessible and user-friendly (ibid.).   
While the UK’s ombuds are now a well-established feature of the constitution 
(Buck et al, 2011), their exact roles and constitutional position remain subject to debate. 
Ombuds have been seen either as part of a political system of redress (Elliott, 2012), 
part of a new ‘integrity branch’ of government (Buck et al, 2011), part of the formal 
justice system (Magnette, 2003), or as a hybrid institution sitting between legal and 
political forms of control (Gill, 2014). The core purpose of ombuds in the UK also 
remains contested, with the emphasis ombuds place on either ‘fire-fighting’ (individual 
redress) and ‘fire-watching’ (administrative improvement) remaining unclear (ibid.). 
O’Brien (2015) has argued that ombuds are increasingly torn between a consumerist 
model of justice and one based on deliberative democracy. This has been reflected in 
the development of informal resolution procedures used by ombuds, which have now 
partly replaced ombuds’ focus on formal investigation (Bondy et al, 2014).  
 
The ombuds watchers’ campaigns 
 
In the last 15 years, some of the main UK ombuds – including the Local Government 
Ombudsman (LGO), the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (SPSO), and the 
Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (PHSO) – have been subject to 
campaigns by groups of dissatisfied complainants. The groups examined in this article 
are: ‘Local Government Ombudsman Watch’ (LW), ‘Accountability Scotland’ (AS), and 
‘PHSO the Facts’ (PF). Some brief details are given here about each group. 
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LW was set-up in 2003 with a focus on the LGO. In 2009, it broadened its 
emphasis to consider public services ombuds in general and to facilitate others to 
campaign. The LW website ceased to be updated in the course of 2013, although at 
least one member of the group remained active until October 2014. It is unclear how 
many people were involved in LW although, when active, its website listed a number of 
people as members. Its activities mainly involved information-provision through its 
website and the submission of responses to Select Committee inquiries. 
 AS has its roots in an organisation called Scottish Ombudsman Watch, whose 
website was set up in 2006. It is not clear when AS itself was set up, but its website 
refers to AS having an elected committee since 2011. The group has 70 or more 
registered supporters, of which 20 are actively involved and 3 are very actively involved. 
Its Facebook page has 53 ‘likes’. The AS website has well-organised content, including 
a members’ area. The organisation has committee meetings with agendas posted 
online and has also organised a conference to promote its work.  
 PF was founded in 2013. It had 12 members when set-up, although its current 
membership is unknown. Its website has received 26,000 hits and its blog 17,000 hits. 
Its Twitter account has 674 followers and its Facebook page has 185 ‘likes’. The 
campaign has a blog and the group regularly lobbies a range of policymakers. The 
campaign has also organised a rally and a parliamentary briefing for MPs.  
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Part II: the legal consciousness literature 
 
Legal consciousness studies have been analysed in a number of recent works (Cowan, 
2004, Hertogh, 2004, Silbey, 2005, Halliday and Morgan, 2013). Silbey (2005) 
describes how legal consciousness scholarship initially emerged from law and society 
research concerned with exploring the gap between law in books and law in action. This 
research adopted a ‘law first’ approach (Cowan, 2004) concerned with examining 
whether legal rules achieve their purpose. This emphasis was later challenged by a law 
in society approach, which saw the law more as a constitutive social process, with the 
law providing ‘an ongoing structure of social action’ that helped to shape social relations 
(Silbey, 2005, p. 328). As a result, law’s hegemonic grip on society was seen to result 
from ‘social transactions becoming habituated practices and institutionalized into 
principles, patterns, and institutions’ (Silbey, 2005, p. 331). A strong influence on legal 
consciousness research was the Critical Legal Studies movement’s concern with 
understanding ‘law’s hegemonic role in sustaining domination’ (Morgan and Kuch, 2015, 
p. 566). This influence can be seen in the claim that the aim of legal consciousness 
studies is to explain the persistence of legal hegemony: 
 
‘How [can] we explain… unrelenting faith in and support for legal institutions in 
the face of… consistent distinctions between ideal and reality…?’ (Silbey, 2005, 
p. 326) 
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In terms of the concept of legal consciousness itself, no single definition is 
accepted, although it is generally considered to refer to the way people understand and 
use the law (Merry, 1985), placing emphasis on the experiences of ordinary people 
(Cowan, 2004). The concept has two elements: legality and consciousness. 
Consciousness refers to the process through which the meanings that people ascribe to 
their world settle into a stable pattern (Silbey, 2005). Through a process of 
institutionalization and socialization, such meanings eventually become the 
unquestioned assumptions people hold about a particular facet of social life (Merry, 
1990). The study of consciousness, therefore, is the study of the process through which 
meanings settle into baseline assumptions about the world and of the way those 
assumptions structure how the world may be interpreted. With regard to legality, 
Hertogh (2004) has pointed out that this concept has been approached differently in 
North American and European scholarship. He argues that North American scholars 
have tended to focus on ‘official law’ (state law), while European scholars have tended 
to focus on ‘living law’ (the norms people consider to be important, regardless of any 
official status). Legal consciousness can, therefore, be seen as a broad concept that 
encompasses ordinary people’s understandings both of official law and other norms that 
shape their world.  
Central to legal consciousness research are complex interactions between 
power, resistance, and deference. Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) analytical framework 
distills these ideas into three cultural schemas that provide a ‘cultural toolkit from which 
popular understandings of legality are constructed’ (Silbey, 2005, p. 349). According to 
Sewell (1992), cultural schemas are metaphors of communication, action, and 
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representation, which circulate amongst social actors and provide the context for 
creating meanings. Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) three schemas are shown in box 1. 
 
 
 
Box 1: Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) cultural schemas 
 
According to Silbey (2005, p. 349), legal consciousness consists of ‘mobilising, 
inventing, and amending pieces of these schemas’. The schemas do not exist 
independently, but occur in varied constellations. Central to Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) 
model is the idea that this limited set of schemas constrains popular legal 
consciousness in ways that mean that legal hegemony is preserved.  
Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) schemas have recently been supplemented by a 
fourth schema, referred to as ‘under the law’ (Fritzvold, 2009). Here, people violently 
reject the law, conceiving of the social order as fundamentally illegitimate. Whereas the 
 Before the law. People are impressed by the law’s majesty and persuaded 
of its legitimacy. 
 
 With the law. People use the law instrumentally for strategic ends and see 
law as a game. 
 
 Against the law. People are cynical about the law’s legitimacy and distrust 
its implementation. 
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‘against the law’ schema involves mild forms of resistance, the ‘under the law’ schema 
involves flamboyant law-breaking. The latter approach is, therefore, anti-hegemonic in 
its resistance to legal ideology and involves its explicit challenge. The political 
dimensions of resistance have also been highlighted by Halliday and Morgan (2013) in 
their application of cultural theory to legal consciousness. Drawing on Mary Douglas’ 
(1992) cultural theory framework, Halliday and Morgan (2013) classify Ewick and 
Silbey’s (1998) three schemas according to four cultural types varying across ‘grid’ and 
‘group’ dimensions. The grid dimension refers to cultural preferences regarding how 
individuals relate to authority and the extent to which a society’s culture either defers to 
hierarchical authority (high grid) or prefers egalitarian models of social organisation (low 
grid). The group dimension meanwhile refers to cultural preferences regarding the 
extent to which a society’s culture is individualistic (low group) or communitarian (high 
group). Figure 1 shows Halliday and Morgan’s (2013) application of cultural theory to 
Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) schemas. 
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Figure 1: Applying cultural theory to legal consciousness  
 
Figure 1 displays the four cultural types produced by the application of cultural theory to 
the study of legal consciousness. In both ‘high grid’ types, law is deferred to, while in the 
‘low grid’ types it is resisted. Deference and resistance to law then vary according to 
whether there is a purely individual (‘low group’) or a collective basis (‘high group’) for 
such a response. Halliday and Morgan (2013) associate Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) 
three cultural schemas with three cultural types: the ‘against the law’ schema is 
associated with fatalistic acceptance of law; the ‘before the law’ schema is associated 
with deferential acceptance that law serves collective interests; and the ‘with the law’ 
schema is associated with individualism, where individuals use law as a resource to 
serve their own ends. As will be clear, the fourth type shown in figure 1 – ‘low grid/ high 
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group’ – represents a new category, not reflected in Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) model. 
Halliday and Morgan (2013, p. 28) suggest, therefore, that the application of cultural 
theory demonstrates a ‘missing narrative’, which they refer to as collective dissent and 
which has three distinguishing characteristics: (1) state law is seen as illegitimate (2) an 
alternative vision of law beyond the state is advanced and (3) a gaming approach is 
adopted to state law. Importantly, Halliday and Morgan’s (2013) collective dissent 
schema represents a counter-hegemonic narrative, which opens up ‘opportunities to 
build alternative imaginaries and institutions’ (Morgan and Kuch, 2015, p. 567). This 
echoes Fritzvold’s (2009) development of an explicitly political dimension in his ‘under 
the law’ schema, where resistance to power serves collective ends. 
 An alternative model for understanding variations in legal consciousness has 
been offered by Hertogh (2011). He explores alienation from the formal justice system 
and considers this across two dimensions: legal mobilisation (whether people use the 
system) and legal protest (the tactics people employ following an unsatisfactory 
experience of the justice system). In order to study legal alienation and the propensity 
for individuals to engage in mobilisation or protest, Hertogh (2011) distinguishes four 
normative profiles, based on variations in legal awareness and legal identification. 
These are shown in figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Normative profiles of legal consciousness 
 
Hertogh’s normative profiles suggest four responses to the legal system. ‘Legalists’ 
have a good knowledge of law and identify with it. ‘Loyalists’ share this identification, but 
do so on the basis of vague knowledge about law. ‘Cynics’ meanwhile are aware of law, 
but do not share its values. Finally, ‘outsiders’ have little awareness of law nor do they 
identify with it; unlike cynics who use the law for their own purposes, outsiders are 
entirely alienated from it. Hertogh (2011, p. 31) suggests that these profiles are helpful 
for understanding the basis of people’s criticisms of the justice system and: 
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‘…help us look beyond common stereotypes and consider critics of the justice 
system as real persons with genuine concerns about the administration of 
justice.’ 
 
For the purposes of this article, Hertogh’s (2011) study adds an additional dimension to 
Fritzvold’s (2009) and Halliday and Morgan’s (2013) emphasis on counter-hegemonic 
forms of collective protest, in that it focuses attention on protest about the operation of 
the justice system (e.g. protests against miscarriages of justice or inequality in the 
administration of justice).  
 
Part III: applying legal consciousness approaches to the ombuds context 
 
In this section, legal consciousness concepts are applied to the ombuds context in order 
to: (1) demonstrate how legal consciousness may be adapted to study ombuds users’ 
experiences and (2) to set out, as a basis for empirical research, an integrated analytic 
framework.   
 Before proceeding, it is important to justify the application of legal consciousness 
concepts to the ombuds setting. An objection might be raised that legal consciousness 
does not provide an appropriate framework for considering ombuds, since they are non-
judicial processes. Ombuds might, for example, be seen as a political form of redress 
(Elliott, 2012), rather than being part of the justice system. This article argues that while 
ombuds are non-judicial institutions, they are not non-legal. Public service ombuds are 
statutory bodies, with defined legal jurisdictions and legal powers of investigation. And 
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while ombuds have an extra-judicial jurisdiction to consider maladministration, this does 
not take away from the fact that ombuds routinely apply the law in determinations 
(Remac, 2013). It is also well accepted that, as a state-sponsored means of redress for 
complaints about government, ombuds are one of the four ‘pillars’ of the administrative 
justice system (Law Commission, 2010). As such, it is reasonable to characterise 
ombuds as, at least, quasi-legal institutions.  
In applying legal consciousness frameworks to the quasi-legal context of the 
ombuds, the article situates itself within a well-established strand of the legal 
consciousness literature. For instance, both Cowan (2004) and Lens (2007) use legal 
consciousness as a framework for exploring citizens’ encounters with public 
bureaucracies, while Hoffmann (2003) uses it as a framework for investigating 
workplace grievances. Indeed, there are parallels between Hoffmann’s (2003, p. 693) 
argument for the application of legal consciousness approaches beyond the formal 
justice system and our own attempt to apply the concept beyond its traditional confines: 
 
“While this article examines internal company rules and formal grievance 
procedures rather than laws and courts, interviewees’ legal consciousness at 
their workplace is comparable to legal consciousness in the more traditional 
sense. For example, the rules and grievances procedures of the workplaces 
explored in this article are all associated with fairness, rule determinacy and 
rights – key symbols of law and legal authority.” 
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It is also noteworthy that there is precedent for the application of legal consciousness to 
study aspects of the ombuds process, such as in Hertogh’s (2013) study examining 
public trust and ombuds. 
The article suggests that legal consciousness is a legitimate framework in this 
context for two further reasons: (1) people’s responses to the ombuds – as a system of 
justice – are likely to be influenced by their basic orientations to the law and (2) legal 
consciousness provides a framework for understanding citizens’ own beliefs about 
justice and calls for a more pluralistic approach than merely considering responses to 
narrowly defined state law (Hertogh 2004). As will be shown below, the ombuds 
watchers clearly see ombuds as legal institutions, ‘dignified by the state as a governing 
body’, in the words of one of the watcher groups. Indeed, the ombuds watchers’ 
expectations of ombuds are, at least in part, influenced by legal ideas drawn from their 
understandings of the formal justice system. At the same time, however, the watchers 
recognise ombuds as legal institutions in themselves, so that their criticism of ombuds 
can legitimately be seen through the lens of legal consciousness. Indeed, as will 
become apparent in the article’s data analysis, while the ombuds watchers’ focus is 
initially on ombuds, they eventually dissent from the wider system of political and legal 
redress which they come to see as complicit in preserving an unjust status quo. 
Importantly, that status quo is understood by the ombuds watchers as legally-
sanctioned, with ombuds being a part of a legal and political system that is, in the words 
of one of the groups, ‘corrupt by design’.  
 Most studies interested in responses to justice processes and the extent to which 
decisions are accepted as legitimate, have drawn on procedural justice theory (Lind and 
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Tyler, 1988). These have generally been quantitative and aimed at examining the extent 
to which the qualities of dispute processes affect the propensity of the individuals to 
accept their outcomes. While these approaches are helpful in establishing the likelihood 
that decisions will be seen as legitimate, they are limited when considering subsequent 
responses to dissatisfaction. Effectively, the procedural justice literature ends its 
analysis after considering whether features of process have affected users’ acceptance 
of outcome. By contrast, this article’s interest is in exploring what individuals do once 
they come to see an outcome as unsatisfactory. The legal consciousness literature’s 
emphasis on the strategies, resources, and schemas which individuals draw on to make 
sense of their experiences of justice therefore provides an insightful and complementary 
framework to procedural justice theory. 
  We can now provide an integrated model of legal consciousness for application 
to the study of user experiences of ombuds. Figure 3 adapts Halliday and Morgan’s 
(2013) terminology in order to refer specifically to the ombuds system and integrates 
Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) three schemas and Hertogh’s (2011) four normative profiles 
into the overall framework provided by Halliday and Morgan (2013). 
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Figure 3: An integrated legal consciousness model for analyzing interactions between 
citizens and ombuds systems 
 
The model in figure 3 indicates ideal-type orientations which citizens may have to the 
ombuds system. Citizens’ two basic responses are to defer to or to resist the system’s 
exercises of authority. Deference may take the form of alienation from the ombuds 
system, where the individual is highly dissatisfied and considers an outcome illegitimate, 
but feels powerless to resist. Deference here is fatalistic and the individual stands 
outside the ombuds system’s norms and values. Alternatively, deference may have a 
more positive form, as individuals feel personally aggrieved, but recognize the 
fundamental legitimacy of the outcome and the need to defer to community values. 
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Deference here takes the form of loyalty to a system in which the individual is invested 
and which broadly serves his or her interests.  In terms of resistance, this may initially 
take the form of individual dissent, where legal appeals and other strategies (such as 
writing to MPs or newspapers) are designed specifically to address a perceived 
individual injustice. Here, individuals become cynical about the potential for achieving 
justice, but continue to seek to use their rights in pursuit of their self-interest. Finally, 
resistance may take on a collective dimension, as individuals seek to challenge aspects 
of the ombuds system’s operation, not on their own behalf but in order to uphold a 
perceived public interest. Here, resistance moves into the realms of collective protest 
and individuals band together to reshape those aspects of the system which they 
consider unjust. As we shall we see in the case study below, collective dissent draws on 
a range of schemas, strategies, and resources, rather than being predominantly 
associated with any single approach.  
  
Part IV: Case study methodology  
 
The case study draws on two data sources. The primary source is online content 
produced by the ombuds watchers, which is supplemented by data collected at two 
meetings held with watcher representatives.4 The analysis below is mostly based on the 
online data. For the documentary analysis, the content of the ‘PHSO the Facts’ (PF) and 
‘Accountability Scotland’ (AS) websites were used. Unfortunately, the LGO Watch (LW) 
website is no longer online and, as a result, its data were unavailable. As a substitute, 
                                               
4 In relying predominantly on naturally occurring data, the study follows the tradition of legal 
consciousness research whereby individuals are not asked directly about their experiences of law. 
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data was collected from the LGO Watcher blog, operated by an LW member, in addition 
to collecting LW documents that remained online.5 The meetings with watcher 
representatives were held in September 2015, in London and Edinburgh, and lasted two 
hours each. The London meeting was attended by two PF members and the Edinburgh 
meeting by two AS members. LW declined to take part because they had ceased 
campaigning. Meeting data were recorded in field notes and a summary was sent to 
participants for confirmation.  
In total, 538 pages of online content and field notes were analyzed using Nvivo 
and Miles et al’s (2014) thematic analysis approach. The first stage involved primary 
coding of the data to map themes and develop memos to track emergent ideas. 
Secondary coding then analyzed the data at a more granular level to break down 
identified themes. A data summary document was prepared to condense, organize, and 
display data and provide the basis for reporting. Finally, data were systematically 
compared to the theoretical framework and themes were re-categorized to make explicit 
connections between the data and existing knowledge.   
In terms of limitations, the findings presented here are exploratory and provide 
only an initial look at a phenomenon which, to date, has escaped scholars’ attention. 
One area where data are currently lacking relates to the watchers’ demographics, with 
little known about the personal characteristics of those who engage in collective 
protests. Greater depth of analysis may also have been possible had interviews been 
conducted with individual ombuds watchers. This would have allowed us to deepen our 
analysis of the ombuds watchers’ legal consciousness. 
                                               
5 The fact that LW is no longer in operation supports Halliday and Morgan’s (2013, p. 21) suggestion that 
dissenting collectives are at threat of ‘schism and collapse’. 
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Part V: The ombuds watchers – a case study of collective dissent 
 
This section organizes the findings according to the three dimensions of collective 
dissent: (1) rejection of the legitimacy of state law, (2) an appeal to a higher law or 
sense of justice, and (3) a gaming approach to the law which seeks to meet collective 
ends. 
 
Rejecting the legitimacy of state law: the ombuds watchers’ critique of the state-
sponsored system of redress for public service complaints 
 
The complaint experience as hegemonic rupture. The starting point for the watchers’ 
critique lies in experiences of the complaint system, which ‘…can be the cause of 
intense… anguish’ (LW). The watchers highlight the material, emotional, and 
psychological costs of unsatisfactory complaint experiences and are concerned: 
 
‘…not with injustice in the abstract, but with the fact that maladministration… 
lead[s] to serious psychological stress.’ (AS) 
 
The watchers emphasize the damage which injustice has on ‘human lives’ (LW). They 
report being contacted by people traumatized by their experiences, who feel anger, 
stress, depression, helplessness, and suicidal ideation. The knock on effects are 
described as including loss of savings, homes, health, and careers.  
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 The experience of complaining is seen as Kafkaesque and consisting of ‘a maze 
of processes’ (PF), where ombuds adopt the gatekeeping approaches used by public 
bodies: ‘… roadblocks are thrown up at every turn’ (PF). This is described by a blog 
commentator as: ‘…a surreal… banging-your-head-against-brick-wall experience’ (PF). 
Particularly significant is the ‘compound’ nature of the experience, where disillusionment 
with a public body is replaced by faith in an ombuds, only to turn to alienation: 
 
‘The suffering is made… more trenchant… by a further experience of injustice 
from a second institution, where that… institution is dignified by the state as a 
governing body…’ (LW) 
 
A key aspect of the complaint experience is shock when expectations are not met. 
Here, the watchers’ expectations fit Hertogh’s (2011) ‘loyalist’ normative profile and 
Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) ‘before the law’ schema. When they experience a problem 
with a public service, they turn to ombuds with the expectation of justice. When 
experience does not match expectation, the watchers are ‘shell-shocked’ (LW). The 
shock of unmet expectation leads to what Silbey (2005) describes as a hegemonic 
‘rupture’, with the ombuds’ legitimacy suddenly called into question.  
 The response to this rupture is deeply personal: ‘Complainants… often blame 
themselves’ (PF). The initial response is for individuals to feel alienated – ‘outsiders’ in 
Hertogh’s (2011) scheme or ‘against the law’ in Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) language – 
and be left ‘feeling helpless and stupid’ (PF). This powerlessness before authority is 
exacerbated by the fact that the act of complaining is itself an act of resistance: ‘People 
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are… taking on the government… this is very scary’ (AS). While the watchers’ response 
is to protest, the experience of powerlessness does not necessarily result in 
mobilization. Indeed, the watchers mix calls for action with despondency, echoing 
Halliday and Morgan’s (2013) finding that dissenting collectives are likely to shift 
between fatalism and collective protest.   
Overall, negative experiences of complaining are described as ‘demoralizing’ 
(AS) and disruptive of citizens’ orientations to the state-sponsored system of justice 
represented by ombuds. Complaint experiences are the crucible in which faith 
transforms into disillusionment, dissent, and protest. Underlying this are interactions of 
powerlessness and resistance, which echo Cowan (2004) and Lens’ (2007) descriptions 
of the legal consciousness of individuals subject to bureaucracy. 
 
A critique of the ombuds’ inquisitorial and bureaucratic justice. The watchers’ key 
criticism relates to ombuds’ inquisitorial approach and the lack of transparency inherent 
in a bureaucratic system of justice. One watcher, referring to Alice in Wonderland, 
describes the ombuds process as follows: 
 
‘The judge settled in his throne in the… empty courtroom… Alice, entered alone, 
awed that the judge… had been appointed by the Red Queen… She presented 
her case and was dismissed to wait outside…. The accused then entered, 
accompanied by his counsel, alleged accomplices and witnesses. The judge then 
summed up the plaintiff’s case as best he could. The accused responded with 
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the help of his retinue …. The judge deliberated on what he had heard and gave 
his verdict. He was happy that there could be no appeal.’ (AS) 
 
The private and bureaucratic character of the ombuds process is a ‘smokescreen’ (PF) 
for the complainant, who is unable to evaluate whether he or she has been treated 
fairly: 
 
‘Justice… require[s] that the… investigator has the… full facts of the case and, 
for the satisfaction of complainants, they must believe this to be so.’ (AS) 
  
The inability to satisfy complainants that they have received a fair hearing is important 
to the watchers’ critique, who argue (in line with procedural justice theory – Lind and 
Tyler, 1988) that it should be possible to satisfy the parties even were the outcome is 
unfavorable: ‘If the SPSO delivers a quality report, both sides should be satisfied’ (AS).  
 The watchers also argue that the ombuds’ inquisitorial method is insufficiently 
robust and participative. They are critical of the paper-based process and the lack of 
face-to-face contact, interviews, and fieldwork. Paper files are seen as ‘useful for the 
primary stage’ but as not providing full accounts (AS). The fact that investigations are 
generally a ‘desk exercise’ (PF) is seen to weight the system against the citizen, since 
public bodies control the production of official records that form the basis of ombuds 
decisions. Information provided by citizens is dismissed as ‘subjective’ or ‘irrelevant’ 
(PF), recalling Lens’ (2007) analysis of welfare recipients’ struggles within the 
bureaucratic forum of the ‘fair hearing system’ in the US. The watchers feel the need to 
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prove their cases, without which bureaucratic accounts will be accepted as fact: 
‘Although you are… asking for an investigation, you… have the find all the evidence 
yourself’ (PF). 
 Linked to a perceived absence of inquiry, the watchers attack what they see as 
lack of impartiality. The watchers’ argue that shared bureaucratic perspectives result in 
relationships between the ombuds and public bodies that are insufficiently challenging. 
One of the watchers, for example, notes that the ombuds encourages a ‘buddy’ 
relationship with bureaucrats, arguing that ‘…this can be likened to encouraging the 
police to form friendships with criminals’ (AS). They believe that ombuds have a similar 
mindset and professional orientation to public bodies: ‘…they are far too emotionally 
and professionally connected with the bodies they should be investigating impartially’ 
(LW). The result is a ‘cozy alliance’ (LW), compounded by an absence of powers which 
leaves the ombuds having to ‘… negotiate with the public body…’ (PF). 
 A further criticism is that the ombuds deploy a form of bureaucratized justice 
which does not chime with the watchers’ own constructions of justice. They argue that 
ombuds provide ‘customer service’ rather than ‘truth and… justice’ (AS). Recalling 
Nader’s (2002, p.144) assessment of ADR as a ‘pacification scheme’, the watchers are 
critical of what they see as bureaucratic manipulation: ‘I can see their… modus 
operandi. Give you loads of sympathy, build you up and [then] drop you’ (LW). The 
watchers identify ombuds’ approaches as conforming to ‘expectations management’ 
(Gilad, 2008), whereby attempts are made to adjust complainants’ expectations with a 
view to reconciling them to adverse outcomes. This is referred to as ‘softening the blow 
with kind understanding’ and seen as patronizing: ‘PHSO… thinks we… will be fended 
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off with fluff’ (PF). The watchers refer to ombuds adopting a ‘call centre model’ (PF) and 
consider that ombuds are overly focused on ‘speed, politeness and cost’ but 
insufficiently concerned with ‘the question of justice’ (AS). Overall, the emphasis on 
customer service and case ‘disposal’ (PF), leads the watchers to conclude that the 
‘ombuds system offers second rate justice’ (PF) and a ‘… pseudo system of 
administrative justice’ (LW).  
 
From the ombuds process to a systemic critique. The watchers’ rejection of the 
legitimacy of state law extends beyond ombuds. Indeed, ombuds are depicted as 
illegitimate in the context of a wider political-legal-bureaucratic establishment which 
shares that illegitimacy. The watchers’ critique includes calls for ombuds to be 
accountable, but shows cynicism about the institutions that might fulfil this role and an 
eventually concludes that the whole system is ‘corrupt by design’ (PF). Corruption refers 
to an institutionalized status quo which works against the interests of citizens. This is 
reflected in one of the watcher’s comments about the possibility of challenging the 
status quo using the legal system: 
  
‘… bear in mind who makes the law, who upholds the law and who benefits from 
the law. It’s not you is it? The judicial system is biased… in favour of 
government organisations and those in power. They make the law in order to… 
keep the little guy out in the cold. You may well need to revise everything you 
ever understood about truth and justice’. (PF) 
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Rather than seeing ombuds as affronting the values of other state institutions, the latter 
become complicit: ‘the political establishment is… very reluctant to call into question the 
integrity of this institution’ (LW). This complicity is seen as benefiting those in power: ‘… 
it’s game, set and match to the political elite’ (PF) and resulting in a lack of challenge to 
‘…the vested interests of those in power and authority who benefit from this unjust 
status quo’ (LW). The result of this analysis is alienation: 
 
‘It is a recipe for… cynicism towards political and government institutions… This 
disillusionment erodes the very foundations on which our social values and 
shared identity as a community are built.’ (LW)  
 
The system of redress is, therefore, described as a ‘dustbin for complaints’ and a 
‘swindle’ (PF), with the system not meeting the needs of citizens because it was not 
designed to: ‘… all the ‘regulation’ by authorities is simply window dressing… it was 
never there to serve you’ (PF).  
 
Summary. The watchers’ rejection of the state provided system for the redress of 
citizens’ complaints is characterized by three features: (1) experiences of injustice which 
lead to a re-evaluation of deferential approaches to state authority and legal institutions, 
(2) divergence between the watchers and ombuds in terms of their constructions of 
justice and the means of delivering it, and (3) a broader rejection – echoing the subjects 
in Fritzvold’s (2009) study – of the legitimacy of the political-legal-bureaucratic order. 
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An appeal to a higher law and sense of justice: the ombuds watchers’ vision for 
an alternative complaints system 
 
A system with social justice, democracy, and the citizen at its heart. The watchers 
offer two alternative visions for a reformed system, the first of which argues for a more 
citizen-centred and humane system, drawing on ideas of social justice and democratic 
engagement. One of the watcher groups favors the idea of a local system, which would 
allow the citizen to access the ombuds in person and facilitate ‘…full, honest, and 
sympathetic discussion of the issues’ (AS). The human aspect of the system is key, with 
its ‘sympathetic’ nature required to overcome the alienating effect of bureaucracy. The 
idea of greater accessibility and a form of justice which is more personal is emphasized 
in calls for interaction with the ombuds to be ‘face-to-face’ (AS). Greater direct 
participation in the process of justice is seen as a remedy to a faceless system, which 
traps individuals in a maze of paperwork. 
Of equal importance, the watchers call for ombuds’ decision-making to be re-
oriented. Developing the criticism that the system pits the citizen against the public 
body’s control of the official record, the watchers argue for a ‘presumption of honesty’ 
(PF), whereby the system would operate on the assumption that citizens are well-
meaning. Complaints, therefore, become a form of democratically engaged participation 
in state administration, rather than damaging processes in which citizens fight for 
justice, with those in power needing to ‘…work with their citizens, and not against them’ 
(LW). This results in a vision which requires: 
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‘…a new concept of active citizenship and social justice, as well as the… 
depolarization of society, where concerned citizens are no longer treated as 
enemies of vested political interests…’ (LW). 
 
This presents a challenge to authority and a call for citizens to be seen as partners in 
the achievement of fairer public services. It appeals to a sense of justice deeply 
involved with the idea of democratic participation and a more horizontal, local, and 
human engagement between citizens, public bodies, and the system of state sponsored 
redress for complaints. As such, its emphasis is political and social, mainstreaming the 
democratic relationship between citizen and state and the need to value the individual 
complaint as a means of preserving ‘…our social values and shared identity as a 
community…’ (LW). In setting out this vision, the watchers reach out for alternative 
ideologies, which resist the hegemony of the status quo and explicitly call for a model of 
justice which departs from those associated with the legal system. This echoes Morgan 
and Kutch’s (2015) suggestion that dissenting collectives, which resist state law based 
on communal understandings of the public good, offer the potential ‘to build alternative 
imaginaries and institutions’ (Morgan and Kuch 2015, p. 567). 
 
A court-like system of formal and adversarial justice. In strong contrast, the 
watchers’ second and sometimes dominant vision is of a reformed system that borrows 
the trappings of the court system. Rather than searching for alternative ideologies, here 
the watchers operate as ‘loyalists’ (Hertogh, 2011), heavily constrained by a ‘before the 
law’ (Ewick and Silbey, 1998) schema. Indeed, a number of the watchers’ criticisms rely 
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on loyalty to aspects of the formal court system: comparisons are often explicit, with one 
of the groups comparing the courts’ ’15 pillars of justice’ with the ombuds’ ’15 pillars of 
injustice’ (LW). So, for example, the idea that courts hear cases openly is compared 
with the ombuds’ private process, or the fact that judges require certain qualifications is 
compared with the lack of prescription regarding the training of ombuds’ staff. Many of 
the watchers’ concerns about the fairness of the ombuds process rely on their 
understanding that similar processes ‘…would not be tolerated in a law court’ (AS). 
Indeed, in describing the ombuds process as ‘second rate’, it is often the failure to 
operate in a judicial mode which is problematic: ‘It does not offer just processes… 
based on the law to produce correct legal outcomes’ (PF). More colloquially, a blog 
commentator notes: ‘We r [sic] here for justice its [sic] the law but all we get is ruff [sic] 
justice’ (PF). 
 In this vision, therefore, the watchers effectively seek the recreation of aspects of 
the court system in the ombuds context. This includes calls for: a right of appeal, 
requirements around legal qualifications, greater use of hearings, replacement of 
ombuds with administrative tribunals, replacement of ombuds with a body operating a 
criminal jurisdiction, legally binding decisions and enforcement powers, a statutory 
definition of maladministration, and a stricter application of natural justice principles. As 
Thomas et al (2013) note when assessing criticisms of the LGO, many of these 
proposals involve a rejection of the distinct contribution of ombuds and a loss of their 
value as a supplement to judicial approaches. But regardless of the merits of these 
suggestions, they demonstrate the watchers’ attachment to a legal consciousness that 
draws its understandings of justice from those associated with the formal legal system. 
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This position is interestingly naïve given the cynicism which the watchers express about 
the judicial system and its involvement in preserving the status quo. While they are 
critical of the formal justice system, therefore, they nonetheless uncritically adopt many 
of its tropes as part of their analysis of the ombuds system. This appears to support 
Silbey’s (2005) emphasis on the hegemonic character of legal ideologies, since despite 
critiquing the legitimacy of the state’s political-legal-bureaucratic establishment, the 
watchers remain constrained by schemas which emphasize loyalty to the narratives of 
formal justice. The latter are, therefore, both a resource used to critique the ombuds’ 
model of justice, at the same time as a constraint which structures their visions of 
potential alternatives.  
 
Summary. The watchers make both an appeal to justice which departs from ideologies 
associated with state law, and an appeal which prefers one conception of state law 
(formal justice) to another (informal justice). As such, it demonstrates the potential 
identified by Fritzvold (2009) and Halliday and Morgan (2013) for anti-hegemonic 
narratives to develop, while also confirming Silbey’s (2005) emphasis on the powerful 
constraint of official law in people’s constructions of justice. The watchers also illustrate 
the dynamic nature of legal consciousness, shifting between being ‘legalist’, ‘loyalist’, 
‘cynic’, and ‘outsider’ profiles (Hertogh, 2011) in the course of setting out their critiques 
and future visions.  
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A collective approach to gaming: the ombuds watchers’ collective purpose and 
protesting tactics 
 
The collectivization of dissatisfaction and the communal dynamics of protest. The 
watchers demonstrate a collective approach to dissent, which goes beyond the pursuit 
of self interest. Indeed, the watchers see themselves as a community of ‘… like minded 
people who understand your despair’ (AS), which lets people know that ‘… they are not 
alone in feeling let down by the system’  (PF). The watchers support distraught citizens 
who contact them ‘… to help them on a practical and emotional level’ (LW) and call for 
collective action: 
 
‘Those members of the public… who are isolated in their misery in dealing with 
officials must get together to change the attitudes of our rulers.’ (AS) 
 
Coming together is depicted as facilitating individuals to make sense of their 
experiences, moving from self-blame towards the construction of critical narratives: 
‘…there was much nodding of heads as we realized that we had all been delivered the 
same closure service’ (PF). Collectivity is the means through which complainants 
rendered helpless could regain a voice and not remain ‘… unfairly shut out in the cold’ 
(PF). The watchers also stress the effectiveness of this strategy: ‘… by coming together 
we have found a voice loud enough to be heard… Collective power has untold strength’ 
(PF).  This empowerment through group structures is aimed at securing changes in the 
public interest: ‘[Our aim is] to improve the service for all those who follow’ (PF). 
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Game playing and a ‘with the law’ orientation. An important feature of collective 
dissent is a gaming approach to law, whereby it is used strategically as a means of 
achieving goals. Such approaches can be seen in one of the group’s campaigns 
encouraging members to make complaints of misconduct in public office to the police: 
‘We are calling on all interested parties to… submit their evidence by following our pro 
forma’ (PF). It seems likely that the watchers are aware of the limited chances of such 
claims succeeding, but the invocation of legal processes is a means of putting pressure 
on the ombuds and keeping campaign momentum up through directed action. Other 
gaming approaches involve the use of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to collect 
information that could be used to disrupt ombuds’ ‘spin’ tactics. As noted above, the 
watchers have limited faith in legal remedies, but despite this, their dissent remains very 
much within the ambit of the ‘with the law’ and ‘against the law’ schemas (Ewick and 
Silbey, 1998) rather than the ‘under the law’ schema (Fritzvold, 2009). Indeed, the 
watchers’ tactics involve a mix of working with legal processes and using methods 
which, although they are beyond the legal system, are nonetheless very much lawful 
(e.g. setting up websites, writing to MPs, organizing events, etc.) As such, despite their 
concerns about the legitimacy of the system, the watchers do not operate outside it and 
play a game within the established rules: 
 
‘… people told me that ‘you can’t beat the system’, but I wasn’t trying to…, I was 
naively trying to use the system I was entitled to as part of my stake in the 
democratic process.’ (PF) 
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Protesting tactics – online voicing, information, and resistance to bureaucratic 
power. The strongest evidence of the watchers’ game playing relates to their use of 
information, which becomes a strategy of resistance to power. Indeed, the watchers are 
critical of the way ombuds present information about their services: ‘Ombuds… control 
the information that is provided publicly about their work’ (PF). The watchers consider 
ombuds to be engaged in ‘propaganda’ (LW), since they are required to play the 
‘accountability game’ (PF) of making themselves look good to stakeholders. Self-
preservation leads ombuds to use obfuscation techniques in responding to scrutiny: 
‘Some involve misinformation or simple evasion of questions… [and] smokescreens of 
barely comprehensible verbiage’ (AS). Generally, the watchers consider themselves to 
be in an information war, where a key tactic of resistance is the provision of information 
to counter the ‘ombudsman’s own PR’ (PF): ‘The purpose of this site is to give you the 
facts behind the rhetoric …. This site gives you both information and a voice.’ (PF).   
Important to the watchers’ strategy is a form of bureaucratic mimicry, with the 
adoption of an objective and detached approach: 
 
‘We might try to prove the point by recounting harrowing tales... However, most 
cases… could be dismissed… as merely ‘anecdotal’. So we focus here on the 
evidence from the SPSO’s own website.’ (AS) 
 
This shows the watchers both operating within the confines of the existing system and 
seeking to resist and subvert it, by co-opting ombuds’ own language and data. 
Understanding institutional skepticism of the personal story, which is ‘regarded with 
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suspicion’ (AS), they seek to use data from other actors to help make their case. This 
frequently involves citing critical comments made in official reviews, parliamentary 
scrutiny processes, by individual MPs and MSPs, newspapers, and advocacy 
organisations. The watchers’ strategies of resistance can also be seen in the way they 
resist attempts by ombuds to marginalize their critiques as vexatious: ‘This is a way of… 
implying that our arguments are of no consequence… We combat the use of such 
phraseology against us’ (AS). This results in language used aiming at restraint:  
 
‘We must play by Parliament’s rules when only Parliament can deliver our 
goals… Are we suggesting that angry complainants should be two-faced? 
‘Restrained and objective’ is a better description.’ (AS) 
 
Such attempts to mimic bureaucratic and legal values of disinterest and objectivity are, 
therefore, a means through which the watchers seek to redress the power imbalance 
between them and ombuds.  
Ultimately, the watchers’ tactics mostly involve politically-oriented strategies of 
information-giving and public voice. Such strategies are facilitates by the internet where 
the watchers become ‘… our own ‘Tripavisor’ of dysfunctional organizations’ (PF). While 
never working ‘against the system’ (PF), nonetheless the watchers recognize the 
importance of seeking a voice and empowerment outside of its structures as well as 
within it. Here the internet is key in redressing power and information asymmetries: 
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‘Treating complainants with contempt was not a problem before the internet. Now 
we… can see the big picture and so can everyone else with a little google 
search.’ (PF) 
 
Summary. The watchers act as groups pursuing collective goals and use a range of 
dissenting tactics. These include strategies that attempt to harness the resources of 
law, politics, and bureaucracy. At the same time, the watchers look for a voice outside 
of these systems and find in the internet an empowering space which allows them to re-
construct their understandings of justice in defiance of the state authority they reject. 
This provides the watchers with their own space, which constitutes both an opportunity 
for healing and a means of action, as noted by one blog commentator: 
 
‘Thank you… for bringing us together – as together we now have a voice. I see 
what you mean about wilderness – a place of despair. Now we have a chance to 
bring justice and hope, and a place of friendship.’ (PF) 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate the value of applying legal consciousness 
approaches to understanding the campaigning activities of groups engaged in legal 
protest against the current system for the redress of public service complaints. It makes 
three claims for its contribution to the existing literature.  
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Firstly, the article has integrated various strands of legal consciousness 
literature, providing a unified approach for application in the context of user experiences 
of ombuds processes. While this framework was principally used to situate and 
conceptualize the collectivized protest of the ombuds watchers, it is hoped that it will be 
deployed in future research in order to explore a broader range of user experiences of 
ombuds. Such research would seek to develop more holistic understandings of the way 
in which citizens construct ideas about justice through the experience of the ombuds 
process. 
Secondly, in presenting the case study of the ombuds watchers, the article has 
sought to demonstrate – in a practical way – the value of applying legal consciousness 
approaches to the ombuds context. While the ombuds watchers represent only a small 
group, who take the unusual step of protesting about their experiences of seeking 
redress, the case study has shown how the schema of dissenting collectivism can help 
to elucidate and situate the way in which these individuals think about law and justice. It 
is hoped that the article has demonstrated the usefulness of legal consciousness 
approaches in analyzing the ombuds watcher phenomenon and in charting their 
critiques, demands for change, and protesting tactics.  
Thirdly, the article has contributed to existing legal consciousness literature by 
providing corroboration for Halliday and Morgan’s (2013) extension of Ewick and 
Silbey’s (1998) schemas to include collective dissent. Our analysis has shown that the 
ombuds watchers meet each of the defining characteristics of dissenting collectivism 
and demonstrate the existence of forms of legal consciousness which present 
‘opportunities to build alternative imaginaries and institutions’ (Morgan and Kuch, 2015, 
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p. 567). In this context, our case study provides a valuable insight into the potential for 
dissenting collectives to challenge the hegemonic structures of state law, while at the 
same time emphasising the continuing power of legal ideology in shaping popular 
understandings of justice.  
Finally, we end with a note on avenues for future research. The current case 
study has examined the experiences of highly atypical citizens, who have not only been 
dissatisfied with their experience of redress, but have engaged in public protest. Future 
research should seek to deploy legal consciousness approaches to study a wider 
population of ombuds users, including those who were satisfied with their experiences. 
This will provide a more holistic picture of ombuds users’ legal consciousness and help 
to develop further our understanding of how users experience ombuds processes. 
Future work should also seek to make connections between data suggesting unmet 
expectations on the part of citizens and current policy developments, both in relation to 
ombuds and the wider justice system. The focus of the present article has precluded 
significant discussion of these issues, but there would be merit in further investigating 
the apparent gaps between what citizens expect and what the system currently 
provides. Current work on redress design (Le Sueur, 2012) has tended to proceed in 
the absence of data about what citizens want from redress systems: future research on 
ombuds users’ legal consciousness has the potential to address this gap. 
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